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Abstract: This paper investigated the impact of political elites’ corruption and political stability on 
economic growth in Nigeria using ARDL bound test approach. The study adopts annual time series 
data for the period of 1996-2017. The stationarity properties of the variables were tested using 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. Result from the bound test reveals that 
corruption exact a negative and significant impact on economic growth both in the short and long run, 
while political stability exact a positive and significant impact on economic growth in the short run and 
an insignificant impact in the long run. This finding reveals that political stability which includes 
stability in government, absence of internal, external and ethnic conflict/tension promote economic 
growth in Nigeria in the short run while corruption contributes to the Nigeria’s economic growth by 
reducing cumbersome bureaucratic control.  
Keywords: Corruption; Political Stability; Economic growth; ARDL 
JEL Classification: D73 
 
1. Introduction 
There exist several opinions on the effect of corruption and political stability on 
economic growth process. Prominently, two schools of thought the non-beneficial 
sand hypothesis and the beneficial grease hypothesis explained the role of corruption 
and political stability in an economy. The non-beneficial sand hypothesis argues that 
corruption and political instability tends to harm the economy by raising the level of 
poverty and directly or indirectly exerting negative influence on output and foreign 
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private investment. On the other hand, the beneficial grease hypothesis asserts that 
corruption contributes to the growth of the economy through the reduction in 
bureaucratic inefficiencies which constitute barriers to investment and economic 
activities (Abu, 2018; Kamaldeen, Umar, & Faliat, 2013).  
Overtime, corruption and political instability have continue to remain pervasive in 
Nigeria. This is apparent from the various corruption cases and political tumult in 
the country. Some of the notable corruption cases include; the unaccountable $16 
billion appropriated for power project under Obasanjo administration, Diezani’s 
corruption case involving billions of naira which led the Federal High Court to order 
the forfeiture of her assets worth ₦7.6 billion in 2017 and the case of recovered $9.2 
million and E74 thousand cash from former group managing director of the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Others include; the charges of armed 
money scandal amounting to ₦28.3 billion by former security adviser to President 
Jonathan, Col. Sambo Dasuki and the corruption charges against former secretary to 
the government of the federation (SGF)1. Additionally, desperation of power by 
politicians, election violence, rigging and many more are manifestations of political 
instability in the country [Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) Report, 2019].  
Similarly, statistics have further revealed the co-existence of high corruption, 
political instability and unimpressive economic growth in Nigeria. Nigeria’s 
corruption index and political stability and absence of violence index have remained 
less than 0.40 on the average out of the maximum of 1.0 between the periods of 1996 
and 2017 periods. A lower value indicates high degree of corruption and high 
political instability and prevalence of violence while a higher value indicates low 
degree of corruption, high political stability and absence of violence. In the same 
vein, Nigeria’s rate of growth measured by the gross domestic product (GDP) growth 
rate shows an unimpressive performance in recent years especially in year 2015, 
2016 and 2017 in which the growth rates were negative (these periods coincide with 
the periods of economic recession in Nigeria). The high degree of corruption, 
political instability and poor growth rates reveals the existence of an interaction 
amongst these variables and the effect of corruption and political instability on 
Nigeria’s economic growth. 
Furthermore, past literatures have established that corruption especially among 
political elites and political instability is a major obstacle militating against the rapid 
growth and development of the Nigerian economy. The debilitating effect of 
corruption and political instability manifest in the form of increased level of social 
vices, insecurity and poverty across the country. However, in spite of the fact that 
corruption and political instability slows growth, there still exist dearth of literature 
and an inconclusive debate on the resultant impact of corruption on an economy. 
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Studies such as Nwaobi (2004), Ekundayo, Barnabes, Adedoyin & Olorunkanmi, 
(2013), Umeh, Kyarem & Martins (2013) and Tarek (2014) maintained that 
corruption increases expenditure on education and capital expenditure, erodes the 
social economic value of a nation, creates inefficiency and injustice in an economic 
system and increases inefficiencies in government expenditure which in turn reduces 
investment and human capital and eventually reduces output. Conversely, studies 
such as Abu, Zaini & Izraf (2014) argued that even though inefficient institutions (or 
bureaucracies) are bad for economic growth, corruption can help reduce the 
damaging impact of such institutions on the economy.  
In consequence, given the controversy on the impact of corruption on economic 
growth in Nigeria and the nonexistence of any study on the interaction between 
political elites, corruption, political stability and economic growth in Nigeria, except 
the study of Abu et al., (2014) who carried out a study on corruption, political 
instability and economic development in the ECOWAS1 region, this gap in the 
literature ignites and motivate the conduct of this study. 
Against the above background, this study is conducted to investigate the interaction 
of corruption, political stability and economic growth in Nigeria from 1996-2017. 
Beside this introduction, this paper is divided into four sections. Section two of this 
paper discusses the literature review on corruption, political stability and economic 
growth, while part three presents the methodology. The fourth section discusses 
result and section five concludes and presents policy recommendations and direction 
for future work. 
 
2. Literature Review 
In this section categorized into two subsections, namely; conceptual clarification and 
empirical review subsections.  
2.1. Conceptual Clarification 
The concept of corruption is complex, which follows the contention of Marquette & 
Peiffer (2014) that, corruption is dynamic and the conceptual interpretation of 
corruption depends on the ability to identify the contexts in which the diverse 
perspectives will be analytically useful when exploring the issue of corruption. 
Generally defined, corruption is “the misuse of public funds for private gains” (Rose-
Ackerman, 2008). According to Amundsen (2006), political corruption can defined 
with reference to both the persons at the peak of political systems and purpose of 
corrupt behavior which in this case is the desire to hold on to power. The “elites” 
refers to the wealthy, well-read and politically influential groups who have capacity 
to dictate public policies through their influence (Okeke & Idike, 2016). Therefore, 
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within this purview, political elites corruption can be describe as political elites at 
the peak of influential levels in the political system who manifest corrupt behaviors 
for the purpose of sustaining power or status and amassing wealth. Political elite 
corruption is when elite politicians and state representatives who are responsible for 
making and enforcing laws on behalf of the people are themselves corrupt in that 
they use political power to ensure that they hold on to power.  
The nonexistence of political stability is the existence of political instability. 
Dowding and Kimber (1993) defined political stability to imply a form of stability 
that refers to specific aspect of the society which form both the political system and 
all its components. On the other hand, Williams (2014), described political instability 
to mean giving an insight on stability and the propensity of a government to collapse 
either as a result of conflict or rampant competition between various political parties. 
Notably, the study observed a deep interconnection between economic growth and 
political stability. It was found that a number of uncertainty is associated with an 
unstable political environment which reduces investment and the pace of economic 
growth. Economic growth is the increase in the volume of production in a country. 
In economic theory, an increase in a country’s material production usually expressed 
in values implies economic growth.  
2.2. Empirical Review of Literature 
There exist a number of studies on the issue of corruption, political stability and 
economic growth. In the foreign scene, the study of Subarwa (2011) revealed that 
economic performance responds positively to less corruption and dominant religion, 
especially Islam. Likewise, Abu et al., (2014) found a positive unidirectional granger 
causality resulting from political instability to economic development in the short 
term and a positive unidirectional granger causality from political instability and 
economic development to corruption in the long term within ECOWAS countries. 
Frunzik (2002) studied the effects of corruption on economic and political 
development of Armenia. From the study, high scale corruption had very harmful 
effects on economic and political development in Armenia. Shera, Dosti and 
Grabova (2014) also analyzed the impact of corruption on economic growth and 
found a statistically significant negative relationship between corruption and 
economic growth. The findings of Tarek (2014) suggests that corruption increases 
inefficiencies in government expenditure and reduces investment and human capital, 
leading to a negative impact on output. The study however noted that, human capital, 
openness and political instability are the most important channel variables, through 
which corruption is likely to reduce growth.  
In the Nigerian context, Kamaladden et al., (2013) investigated the impact of 
corruption on economic development. The findings show that corruption has a 
significant negative effect on economic growth and development. Also, Egunjobi 
(2013) found that corruption per worker directly exert a negative influence on output 
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per worker and indirectly exert a negative influence on foreign private investment, 
expenditure on education and capital expenditure per worker. Abu (2018) tested the 
‘Grease’ Versus ‘Sand’ Hypothesis by investigating how corruption affects 
economic growth. The results show that higher corruption positively and 
significantly affect economic growth both in the short-run and the long-run. The 
finding supports the ‘Grease’ hypothesis, and suggests that corruption contributes to 
the growth of the economy by reducing bureaucratic inefficiencies which constitute 
barriers to investment and economic activities. However, Nwakwo (2014) observed 
a negative relationship between corruption and economic growth. Ekundayo et al., 
(2013) maintained that corruption impairs and impacts economic growth while, 
Shuib, Ekeria and Ogedengbe (2016) found that corruption is inversely related to 
economic growth. Also, the study of Ayoola & Lateef (2014) revealed that 
corruption granger causes foreign direct investment inflow, government expenditure, 
gross capital formation, openness and globalization of the economy.  
Following the review previous literatures above, it can be concluded that studies on 
corruption and economic growth have yielded mixed result. For instance, Nwakwo 
(2014), Kamaldeen et al., (2013) and Egunjobi (2013) all found that corruption 
negatively affect economic growth while, Ayoola and Lateef (2014) found no 
significant relationship between corruption and economic growth. Furthermore, a 
cursory look at previous studies show that the interaction between corruption, 
political stability and economic growth in Nigeria were ignored and no specific 
distinction between political elite corruption and political corruption was found.  
Thus, having identified gaps in previous studies, this study will fills these gaps in so 
many ways. First, the study will use a different data source on corruption and 
political stability and absence of violence from political risk service (PRS) of the 
international country risk guide (ICRG). The international country risk guide 
includes a political risk index, which consists of 12 components measuring various 
dimensions of the political and business environment of a country. Second, the study 
will extend the study period to cover 2017 from 1996 as against the scope of previous 
studies. Thirdly, the study will use a different methodology i.e. Autoregressive 
Distributive Lag Model (ARDL) and also conduct important post evaluation 
diagnostic tests including normality and stability test which were missing in previous 
studies. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Theoretical Framework 
The origin of the institutional theory seems controversial as Lessig (2013) believes 
Dennis Thompson first developed the Institutional corruption theory in 1995. There 
is however, evidence that Klitgaard had a treatise on institutional corruption in 1988 
(Klitgaard, 1990). The Dennis Thompson version first appeared in the context of 
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legislative ethics. Institutional corruption in the context of legislative ethics refers to 
states of affairs in which political benefits such as campaign contributions, 
endorsements, organizational support, or media exposure are made available to 
lawmakers under conditions that tend to promote private interests at the expense of 
the legislature’s public purpose. 
Many variants of institutional corruption have emerged in literature. Lawrence 
Lessig viewed institutional corruption as an economy of influence that weakens the 
effectiveness of an institution, especially by weakening public trust of that 
institution. In this light, he presented his own conception of institutional corruption 
applicable to Congress in the context of a call for campaign finance reform (Lessig, 
2013). While Thompson’s theory focuses on systemic influences inside of Congress, 
Lessig’s account focuses on the systemic effect that Congress’ dependency on 
campaign donations has on its legislative activities. Whatever is the variant 
institutional corruption theory, the attention is on corruption in corporate 
organization and institutions, as opposed to individual corruption. 
The variant of institutional corruption that interest us is the one propounded by 
Klitgaard (1990), and further developed by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). This school of thought believes corruption exists because of 
the failure of state institutions to effectively discharge their responsibilities. When 
the social, political, judicial and economic institutions fail to enforce checks and 
balances that ensure general equilibrium, then the outcome is corruption. The theory 
proposes that Corruption (C) is a function of Monopoly (M), Discretion (D) and 
Accountability. The model is: 
C = M +D –A 
Corruption thrives where there is monopolistic power with an agent on what to 
produce, how much to produce and for whom to produce. When the discretional 
powers reside sorely in one or few agents on when the recipient should have the 
product and how much of it, then fertile grounds for corruption exist. If however, the 
system insists on accountability, then this will be a check on corruption. 
Further developing the Klitgaardian model, the UNDP (2004) added Integrity (I) and 
Transparency (T) i.e. Corruption (C) = Monopoly (M) + Discretion (D) – 
Accountability + Integrity + Transparency; thus making the model: 
C = (M + D) – (A+I+T) 
When accountability, integrity and transparency are sacrificed in the discharge of 
public offices, corruption spreads fast and can easily become endemic. 
This theory seems apt for Nigeria, both in explaining the scope of corruption 
prevailing in institutions like the Nigeria Police Force, and in postulating possible 
solutions. Virtues like accountability and corruption were ignored and institutions 
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like the military governments held absolute monopolistic powers on what project to 
do, when to it, and how much it was to cost Nigeria. Later, other institutions like 
political parties demonstrated discretional powers on who occupied which elective 
position, disregarding the outcomes of many elections.  
3.2. Sources and Description of Data 
This study adopts annual time series data for the period of 1996-2017. The data on 
corruption (COR) and political stability and absence of violence (PSV) were sourced 
from Political Risk Service (PRS) International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and data 
Gross Domestic Growth rate (GDP) a proxy for economic growth was sourced from 
World Bank Data Indicator (WDI). 
3.3. Model Specification 
Against the issues raised above in the theoretical framework, a simple model in 
which economic growth (GDP) is dependent on the level of corruption (COR) and 
political stability (PSV) is specified bellow: 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑆𝑉𝑡  + 𝜀𝑡   (1) 
3.4. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Descriptive statistics was employed to describe the data by exploring the mean of 
the series, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, kurtosis and skewness. The 
analysis was done using E-views 9.0 after this.  
3.5. Unit Root Test 
In order to determine whether the variables are stationary or non-stationary, we used 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips and Perron (PP) tests for stationary. 
Unit root equation is specified in the following forms. 
∆Yt= 𝛽1 + 𝛽2l + 𝛿Yt-1 +ai∑ ∆ 𝑌𝑛𝑖=1 t-1+ Ut  (2) 
Where Δ denotes the first difference,𝑦𝑡 is the time series being tested, t is the time 
trend variable, and n is the number of lags which are added to the model to ensure 
that the residuals, 𝑈𝑡 are white noise. 
A generalized Philips Perron unit root test is also presented in equation 3 below. 
     ∆𝑦𝑡−1 = ∝0+  𝛶𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝑒𝑡   (3) 
The null hypothesis to be tested is Ho: p  = 1 indicating the presence of a unit root.  
3.6. ARDL Bounds Testing for Cointegration 
The Co-integration test is based on Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) by 
Pesaran and Shin (1996); Pesaran and Pesaran (1997); Pesaran and Smith (1998) and 
Pesaran et al., (2001). This technique has a number of advantages over and above 
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the Johansen cointegration technique. First, the ARDL model is the more statistically 
significant approach to determining the co-integration relationship in small samples 
(Ghalak and Siddiki, 2001).While the Johansen cointegration technique requires 
large data samples for validity. Second, the Johansen approach of Co-integration 
requires all regressors to be integrated of the same order, while the ARDL approach 
can be applied whether the regressors are 1(1) and 1(0). This means that the ARDL 
approach avoids the pre-testing problems associated with standard co-integration, 
which requires that the variables be already classified into 1(1) or 1(0) (Pesaran et 
al, 2001). 
The condition for determining the presence of co-integration relationship or 
otherwise requires that if F-stat of the bound test is less than the lower bounds, null 
hypothesis which state that there is no co-integrating relationship is accepted and if 
the F-stat is greater than the upper bounds, then the null hypothesis is rejected. 
However, if the computed F-stat fall between the lower and the upper bounds values, 
the results is inconclusive.  
The ARDL model to be estimated is specified as follows: 
𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0 𝛥𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽3𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0 𝛥𝑃𝑆𝑉𝑡−𝑖 +
𝜙1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝜙2𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜙3𝑃𝑆𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝜀1𝑡                      (4) 
The error correction model is expressed as follows: 
𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0 𝛥𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽3𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0 𝛥𝑃𝑆𝑉𝑡−𝑖 +
𝜋1𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝜀1𝑡                                 (5) 
 
4. Analysis and Discussion of Result 
4.1. Descriptive Analysis of the Variables 
From the descriptive statistics in table 1 below, it is affirmed that all the variables 
under investigation are normally and identically distributed based on the Jarque-Bera 
probability. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
  GDP      COR       PSV 
 Mean  2.733  0.231  0.563 
 Median  3.308  0.250  0.550 
 Maximum  12.457  0.330  0.740 
 Minimum -4.160  0.170  0.460 
 Std. Dev.  3.401  0.048  0.077 
 Skewness  0.545  0.131  1.224 
 Kurtosis  4.659  2.514  3.831 
 Jarque-Bera  3.614  0.279  6.130 
 Sum  60.147  5.100  12.390 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  243.013  0.050  0.127 
 Observations  22  22  22 
Source: Researcher’s computation using E-views v.9.0 
4.2. Unit Root Tests 
Consequently, the result of the ADF and PP unit root tests in table 2 show that all 
the variables have unit roots after differencing except political stability (PSV) which 
is stationary at level; hence the null hypothesis could not be rejected, thereby 
concluding that the variables (GDP and COR) are not stationary at levels. However, 
the ADF and PP tests revealed that the unit roots in the variables disappear after 
taking first difference of the variables, therefore, the variables become stationary, 
which implies that they are integrated of order one 1(I). 
Table 2. Results of ADF and PP Unit Root Tests 
ADF    PP 
Variables    Level  1st difference    Level  1st difference   stationary status 
GDP        -2.297   -6.084***    -2.237   -6.084**  I(I) 
COR    -2.658   -4.285***    -2.695   -4.285***  I(I) 
PSV    -3.922*** -4.487***    -2.885**  -5.060***  I(0) 
Source: Researchers’ Computations using E-views 9.0 
Note: Schwarz Information criterion (SIC) is used to select optimal lag length in the ADF 
test *** and ** indicates statistical significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
4.3. ARDL Bound Test 
The bounds testing results reported in Table 3 revealed that the computed F-statistic 
(3.352) is lower than the upper bound I(1) at 1% level, however, at 5% the computed 
F-statistic fall between the lower and the upper bounds values. This implies that there 
is no cointegrating or long run relationship between the variables at 1% level of 
significance. But at 5% the result is inconclusive. It is necessary therefore to seek 
further evidence of co-integration from ECM Wald (F-test). This result is in conflict 
with the finding of Abu (2018) who found a long run relationship at 1% level of 
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significant. Meanwhile, the result is supported by the finding of Kyarem and Usman 
(2017) and Kyarem and Samuel (2017). The absence of long run relationship likely 
means that corruption and political stability passes through variables to impact 
economic growth, hence the long run relationship is not immediately noticeable.  
Table 3. Results of Bounds Test 
 
Source: Researchers’ Computations using E-views 9.0. (***), (**) and (*) indicates statistical 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
4.4. Short Run Dynamic ECM Wald (F-test) and Long Run Dynamic 
In estimating the ARDL model, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
demonstrates that the optimal lag-length for the variables is (4,0,4). The results of 
the long-run and short-run for the selected models are reported in Table 4 below. The 
results illustrate that reducing corruption has a significant impact on economic 
growth in Nigeria in the long run at 5%, moreover in the short-run reducing 
corruption also has a significant impact on economic growth in Nigeria at 5%, and 
vice versa. A 1 unit increase in the control of corruption index (decrease in 
corruption) reduces economic growth by 47.705% in the long-run and a 1 unit 
increase in the control of corruption index (decrease in corruption) reduces economic 
growth in Nigeria by 41.57% (significant) in the short-run. This means that in the 
short run, control of corruption grease the wheels of corruption in Nigeria. This 
finding is inconsistent with the grease the wheel hypothesis. This suggest that 
tackling or lowering corruption is associated with lower economic growth in Nigeria 
in the short and long run. This finding tallies with the findings of Abu (2018). 
Meanwhile, the results further revealed that higher political stability and absence of 
violence (reducing political instability) has a positive and significant effect on 
economic growth in the short-run at 5%. But in the long run higher political stability 
and absence of violence (reducing political instability) does not affect economic 
growth in Nigeria. Therefore, a unit increase in the political stability and absence of 
violence index (improvement in the political environment) raises economic growth 
by 17.69%. The positive sign of the coefficient of political stability is consistent with 
the view that, in a politically stable environment, the uncertainty and risk associated 
with savings and investment is less which encourages economic growth. 
The coefficient of the error correction term lagged by one period (ECTt-1) is negative 
and significant at 1%, and therefore satisfies a priori expectation. This result 
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demonstrates that 13.8% of any deviations from the equilibrium will be corrected 
within one year. 
The result of the coefficient of determination (R2) show that the model is well fit and 
the probability of the F-statistic show that the overall model well fitted and explained 
by the variables used in the model. Moreover, by approximation the D.W statistic is 
2, this means the model does not suffer from autocorrelation. 
Table 4. Results of ARDL model 
Panel A: Long-run Coefficients - Dependent variable is GDP 
Regressor  Coefficient  Standard Error  T-Ratio Prob. 
C  47.539 169.008 0.281 0.786 
COR -47.705 8.114 -2.633 0.033 
PSV -223.518 656.039 -0.340 0.743 
Panel B: Short-run Coefficients - Dependent variable is ΔGDP 
ΔCOR -41.557 20.625 -2.015 0.057 
ΔPOL t-1 17.697 7.355 2.405 0.047 
ECTt-1 -0.138 0.032 -4.274 0.003 
R2 0.935    
F-stat 10.173  F-stat Prob. 0.002 
D.W-stat 1.785    
Source: Researchers’ Computations using E-views 9.0 
4.5. Results of Residual Diagnostic Tests 
Diagnostics test is a post estimation test conducted to validate the established result. 
Thus, residual diagnostic tests reported in Table 5 below show that the ARDL model 
passes all tests including serial correlation, functional form, normality and 
Heteroscedasticity.  
Table 5. ARDL-ECM Model Diagnostic Tests 
Test Statistic Results 
Serial Correlation: CHSQ(2) 2.151(0.341) 
Functional Form: Reset F-stat(1,6) 00.164(0.699) 
Normality: Jarque-Bera 0.287(0.865) 
Heteroscedasticity: CHSQ(10) 1.118(0.990) 
Source: Researchers’ Computations using E-views 9.0 
The stability property of the estimated parameters was checked using cumulative 
sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and cumulative sum of squares of recursive 
residuals (CUSUMQ). The CUSUM and CUSUMQ results show the constancy of 
estimated parameters in the study period because the plots of both CUSUM and 
CUSUMQ are within the boundaries (see Figures below).  
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5. Recommendations and Direction for Future Work 
It was generally acknowledged that Nigeria has been suffering from high corruption 
and the political aura is unstable overtime. The study found that corruption exact 
significant impact on economic growth both in the long and short run. Corruption 
was found to be negatively related with economic growth in Nigeria, such that 
increase in control of corruption (reducing corruption) reduces economic growth by 
47.7% and 41.5% at 5% level of significance in the long and short run respectively. 
Moreover, in the short run, political stability and absence of violence was found to 
exact positive significant impact on economic growth in Nigeria, while in the long 
run the impact is not significant. This suggests that increase in political stability and 
absence of violence index (improvement in the political environment) raises 
economic growth by 17.69%. The positive sign of the coefficient of political stability 
is consistent with the view that, in a politically stable environment, the uncertainty 
and risk associated with savings and investment is less, and thus encourages 
economic growth. Thus, based on the finding of the study, the study recommends 
the following measures: 
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1. Government should strengthen the anti-corruption agencies and ensure 
immediate punishment of any individual found with corruption cases; 
2. The political elites’ should be caution for desperation of power and 
common/public interest of the society should supersede individual interest.  
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